The rising and setting of the sun (punctuated by seasons), the glacial pace of tectonic changes (interrupted by seismic activity), and the circle of life (interrupted by all that can interrupt life), underscore the (un)certainty of change. In political and geopolitical terms, the past 60 days indicate that the pace of change one usually expects is being radically adjusted. And we are just seeing the beginning of the changes without a full understanding of the impact.
If awareness of life’s normal changes is critical to our ability to survive, blindness to major changes could be threatening. While we do not have the levers to control the coming changes, the cost of ignoring their potential impacts will further dilute our ability to respond, adjust and promote resiliency and assure security. Following are three observations, as the world turns.
The future of alliances
The Trump administration’s “America First” approach to foreign policy has not yet reached maturity. It is clear, however, that “America First” will project itself on the world stage. Tariffs, threats against neighbors like Canada and Panama, interest in imperial acquisition in Greenland are clear indicators. When it comes to the Pacific region, it seems that more will be expected of allies even as American assurances of defense are less certain.
In many respects, the “America First” approach has exposed what already existed just below the surface. Japan and Korea of the 2000s are not developing countries like they were in the 1950s, '60s or even the 1970s. Although they are not world powers, their increasing military capabilities (including the manufacture and export of world-class military technologies) makes U.S. assurances for their defense less significant than half a century ago. Except for the vague U.S. commitment to “extended deterrence” (i.e. use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defend Japan or Korea), the conventional defense capabilities of U.S. allies are considerable.
“America First,” however, is making the U.S. extended deterrence commitment seem even more unlikely than most realists have always imagined. Few strategic thinkers believe that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to engage another nuclear power over the status of Japan or South Korea. It is for this reason that South Korea has a long history promoting the idea that it should adopt nuclear weapons. Even Japan’s history as the only country in which nuclear weapons have been used has long held the view that its peaceful use of nuclear reactors would allow it to produce weapons in a short amount of time.
The veneer of U.S. “extended deterrence” is beginning to crack. As the U.S. pushes its Pacific allies to do more for their own defense, they will need less from the U.S. The U.S. will be less able to make demands of them and their willingness to accede to U.S. demands will diminish. The glacial pace of these changes is already evident in the movement of some U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam. The U.S. did not want to make the move, but the Japanese made it happen. Although accelerated changes may not happen overnight, the rate of change is likely to increase in the coming years as allies become increasingly anxious about the reliability of the U.S. as a security partner and develop their own nuclear weapons capabilities.
The Golden Dome and 'missile defense' in Guam
The proposal for a missile defense system in Guam seems small by comparison to President Trump’s direction to create a “Golden Dome” over the United States. It is not clear how (or if) the push for a Golden Dome will impact the system proposed for Guam. However, much of the technology that is being rolled out for the Missile Defense Agency’s Integrated Air (and) Missile Defense of Guam (IAMDOG) would have direct application to the “Golden Dome.”
Shortly before the idea of a missile shield across the United States was being announced by President Trump, questions about the viability of the IAMDOG system were again being raised by the Pentagon’s Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). Just after the president’s “Golden Dome” announcement, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) raised basic questions about the capability of a critical systems component – the ability of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites to communicate by laser connections.
Notwithstanding, all of the questions about how (and if) an IAMDOG or “Golden Dome” system would be effective, work on these systems continues. The gap between what is seen and what will be delivered, however, can be great. An example of this gap is the recent explosion of radome “golf balls” around the island (and more are coming). Many of these are being built to support the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) of a LEO satellite network.
The PWSA has been developed to (1) warn about and track missiles from their launch and (2) communicate the information between satellites and down to earth stations (like those in the radome “golf balls” proliferating in Guam). But a fundamental element of the system (the laser communications component) is simply not ready for prime time. In addition to the GAO’s recent takedown of the laser communications system, the SDA subsequently announced that it was (again) delaying the launch of its PWSA laser communications “transport” satellites. These satellites, now slated to be almost a year behind schedule – and true capabilities remaining unknown – are an element of faith that we see manifested in huge golf balls showing up across the island.
Will these systems ultimately work? Perhaps. But when and how well will remain unknown for years. The “missile defense” project remains an example of systems that do not reflect real-world conditions. Still, the missile defense industry flourishes on faith, deep monied interests, and the military’s genuine desire for a system of defense that mitigates the impact of modern weapons systems.
“Golf balls” in Guam are silent reminders of how important the island is to the U.S. military network. The radomes occupy both (1) an actual space in Guam and (2) in space in our minds, visually reinforcing notions of Guam’s militarism. But in low earth space, and the communications space between satellites and between satellites and golf balls in Guam, it remains to be proven how important Guam really is. The Guam space, then, is a space of utility. Here even the unproven has value to those with aspiration, money and hope in new weapons of defense. In U.S. strategy, Guam is important, but it is a subject of strategy and not the object.
Strategy and defense vs. security
The future of the region is less likely to be dominated by a U.S. security posture. It is also likely to be more nuclear. U.S. allies and alliances will continue, but those on the front lines of a conflict in Asia will be less responsive to U.S. strategy in the region. This will change the U.S. presence, posture and projection in the region. The U.S. strategy will change, and Guam is almost certain to be impacted (although how, is not yet clear).
Strategy is about victory. If allied nations on the front lines of potential conflict in our region are not likely to absorb hostile blows in support of U.S. strategy, adjustments to U.S. strategy will have to incorporate new parameters. Clearly, U.S. strategy related to Guam will be determined by Guam’s profile in the strategy. Is our island a bigger base, or a smaller one? Will we occupy a demilitarized area, or a fully weaponized multinational buffer zone? Is the island disposable in a larger U.S. strategy? Whatever the U.S. strategic view of Guam, questions about defense need to be separated from discussion of security.
We have heard a lot about the defense of Guam over the past few years. As long-range weapons have become more precise, and as China has developed the capability and capacity to deliver other precision weapons from air or sea, U.S. bases in Guam are at risk. From the military perspective, more defenses are necessary. Air and missile defense systems are part of the strategy. But an operating concept called “Distributed and Dispersed” (D2), which will scatter U.S. military assets from Saipan and Tinian to Yap and Palau, is a part of the strategy. Two recent Pentagon-funded studies note that none of the airfields in the region, however, will be secure during a conflict.
One should certainly not doubt the military’s commitment to defend their bases (and even Guam). After all the U.S. military works for the Department of Defense. But defense is just one part of strategy. Losing Guam in conflict is also anticipated in the D2 “scoot and scatter” plans. Today, many of the elements being constructed in the name of Guam’s defense are not certain to be effective and even if they worked, they would not guarantee the island’s security.
Security is different from defense. Security is only achieved in the aftermath of a successful strategy, where security is the object of the strategy. For example, a successful U.S. strategy would prioritize “homeland security.” This seems clear with the recently announced “Golden Dome” project. As the world turns, and the tectonic plates of geopolitics show seismic movement, strategic awareness is the first step in managing Guam’s security. This awareness will require a critical examination of all that is said and seen. It needs to be measured against the value of our secure future.
Island leaders and communities in our part of the world must be actively engaged in understanding long-term security and short-term defense. This will help the region become a strong force for stability and security. This will assist the islands make plans, which include their interests rather than just react and respond to external pressures.
The Pacific Center for Island Security is a Guam-based nongovernmental, nonprofit organization and research institute that anchors an island and islander perspective among geopolitical posturing and in regional security issues. Its advisory council includes former presidents of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Kiribati and the Republic of Palau. For regular updates, PCIS is on X, formerly Twitter, @PCIS_Guam.